incompatible share mode, probably by FDSZ/CEXYZ), then re-attempt the open
using fopen (shareable open).

added protocol string argument.

Unix?).

is used by sbbscon to re-load the relevent portion of the startup .ini file
when a server is recycled, allowing dynamic changes to sbbs.ini.

you don't want something/one writing to the file while it's being transferred.

(using gethostname).

files in the format: ctrl/<action>[.host][.service].
Examples:
* ctrl/recycle - recycle all services on all hosts
* ctrl/recycle.vert - recycle all services on system with hostname "vert"
* ctrl/shutdown.vert.telnet - shutdown telnet service on vert only
[service] can be "telnet", "ftp", "mail", "web" or "services".

The old recycle semaphore filenames (e.g. telnet.rec, ftpsrvr.rec, etc.) are
still supported for backward-compatibility.

(apparent cause of Win32 lock-up when closing socket from non-owner thread)
using bool terminate_server instead, which doesn't abort select(), so using
shorter default sem_chk_freq value (2 seconds vs 5).

the CRTL implementation of vsnprintf().

in JSexec-win32.

options, and interface_addr.

function prototypes (currently using LOG_INFO level for all).

recycling without using semaphore files.

back to callback functions (e.g. lputs, thread_up, etc). This allows servers
to share the same callback functions, eliminating many nearly-identical
functions. This was able to shave quite a bit of redundant code from ntsvcs.c.
This feature is not utilized in sbbs (sbbscon.c) or sbbsctrl (mainformunit.cpp).

to track down the issue, I finally gave up... as a result, there is a new
feature!

Linux will no longer completely drop it's root privs (It never really did
anyways, and you couldn't possibly make it... but now it does so even less)

As a result, Linux can now recycle all servers when running as non-root.

From a security standpoint, doing this is more secure than running as root,
but less secure than the behaviour on POSIX.4 compliant pthreads.  Running
the BBS as root means that if a user can create a file with the name of his
choice, or pass *any* command through to a shell, that user will get root
access to the machine.  Using the new behaviour, the user would need to
trick the Synchronet binary itself into executing arbitrary and specially
crafted code... probobly using the dreaded buffer overflow... of which
there are probobly some in the web server code.  :-)  If the user can do
this much more tricky feat, then the user gets root privs.  If not, the
user will have to find something else to exploit on your system.

Knowing that some *BSD users (surely not OpenBSD users though) will want to
trade security for convenience, I stole a page out of the Sendmail book and
implemented a "DONT_BLAME_SYNCHRONET" make option.  Compiling like this:
gmake DONT_BLAME_SYNCHRONET=1

Will implement this same behaviour on non-Linux platforms.  Allowing this
partial security feature.

"max_bytes" value is insufficient for the number of configured items:
by defining dynamically created objects and arrays as properties of child
objects of the global object immediately after such objects are created,
they are "implicitly rooted", protecting them from (unexpected) garbage
collection. Now the initialization will simply fail with a nice "out of memory"
error. This was a long-standing bug that rarely occurred in the wild.

to be included in the system's upload and download statistics.

Created writeln() method (with print as alias).

can make a download free for a particular user from a particular file area,
with support for per-directory exemption ARS (finally).

Added semaphore file check frequency (sem_chk_freq) element to all server
startup structures (previously hard-coded to 2 seconds in most cases), defaults
to 5 seconds.
New SemFileCheckFrequency value in .ini file (both global and per-server).